



Oman

Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review

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Submitted by:

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The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy (OCHR) is an independent non-governmental and non-profit organisation dedicated to the monitoring and documentation of human rights violations within the Sultanate of Oman. The OCHR operates from the United Kingdom due to legal restrictions in Oman that criminalise the establishment of political or human rights-focused associations. This prohibition is enshrined in Article 116 of the Omani Penal Code and reinforced by Article 26 of Royal Decree No. 17/2025, which effectively bars the formation of any entity engaged in political or human rights advocacy. OCHR was founded in February 2013.

The Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) is an independent, non-profit CSO founded in April 2011. GCHR provides support and protection to human rights defenders (HRDs) in the MENA region to promote human rights, including the rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression.

1. Introduction

- 1.1. In this submission, the Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy (OCHRD) and the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) examine the Government of Oman's compliance with its international human rights obligations to create and maintain a safe and enabling environment for civil society.
- 1.2. We analyse Oman's fulfilment of the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association, peaceful assembly as well as the authorities' unwarranted restrictions on HRDs since its previous Universal Periodic Review (UPR) adoption in 2021. To this end, we assess Oman's implementation of recommendations received during the last UPR cycle relating to these issues and provide a number of follow-up recommendations.
- 1.3. During the 3rd UPR cycle, the Government of Oman received 48 recommendations relating to civic space and the death penalty. Of these recommendations, 28 were supported and 10 were noted, and six were partially supported.¹ An evaluation of a range of sources and human rights documentation addressed in subsequent sections of this submission demonstrates that the Government of Oman has generally not implemented these recommendations. Acute implementation gaps were found with regard to the right to freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and issues relating to the right to a fair trial and due legal procedures. As a result of these gaps, civic space in Oman is rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor,² indicating particularly severe restrictions of the fundamental rights of civil society and high levels of risks for activists, at home and abroad.
- 1.4. In this report:
 - Section 2 concerns Freedom of Expression
 - Section 3 concerns Freedom of Association
 - Section 4 concerns Freedom of Assembly
 - Section 5 concerns the Targeting of Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Activists
 - Section 6 concerns the Death Penalty
 - Section 7 contains recommendations to address the concerns raised.
 - Annex 1 outlines the implementation of 3rd cycle UPR recommendations related to civic space.

¹ See included Annex: Assessment of implementation of civic space recommendations under the 3rd cycle

² <https://monitor.civicus.org/country/oman/>

2. Freedom of Expression

- 2.1. In the previous UPR Cycle, Oman accepted 15 of the 20 recommendations of freedom of expression and noted 5. The noted or rejected recommendations all referred to amending the penal code, press and public communications law, the Telecommunications Law, the Cybercrime Law or mentions of defamation provisions, which will be shown below to be the tools used to suppress dissent.
- 2.2. Oman has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) despite recommendations in previous UPR cycles to do so. This leaves Oman as an international outlier in this regard.
- 2.3. Oman has longstanding laws that limit freedom of expression by allowing the authorities to criminalise peaceful dissent. A new media law increases restrictions on expression and a new Nationality law will allow the stripping of nationality for dissent, as explained below.
- 2.4. Article 97 of the Omani Penal Code states “*Whoever commits, publicly or by publication, a challenge to the rights of the Sultan and his prerogatives, or disgraces his person, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period no less than (3) three years and not exceeding (7) seven years.*”³ This *lèse-majesté* law criminalises actions perceived as offensive to or undermining the prestige of His Majesty.
- 2.5. Article 97 of the Penal Code has been used by the Internal Security Service against individuals who have expressed critical opinions on the X platform regarding the absolute power of the monarch. These individuals have been summoned, subjected to intimidation, and ordered to delete their posts. They have also been warned against publishing similar content in the future, under threat of legal consequences.
- 2.6. In March 2024, the authorities withdrew and banned numerous books during the Muscat International Book Fair, including:
 - *The Hidden in My Words* by Sulayman Al-Maamari
 - *The Story of Our People and the Revolution* by Noura Al-Shahri
 - *Uncertainty* by Mohammed Al-Fazari.⁴
- 2.7. Article 115 of Oman’s Penal Code. has been utilised to suppress bloggers, writers, and activists who seek to criticise the government or uncover instances of corruption. Similar provisions—such as Article 19 of the Cyber Crime Law—were invoked in March 2023 to shut down the media platform WAF,⁵ as publicly confirmed by its founder. The same legal provisions were also employed in 2016 to close the newspaper *Azamn*.⁶

³ https://oman.om/docs/default-source/default-document-library/omani-penal-law.pdf?sfvrsn=64250c36_2

⁴ The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy, *The Annual Report of Human Rights Violations in Oman – 2024* (January 2025), available at <https://ochrdoman.org/en/annual-report-2024-2/> (Chapter 14).

⁵ The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy, *The Annual Report of Human Rights Violations in Oman – 2023* (January 1, 2024), available at <https://ochrdoman.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/The-Annual-Report-Oman-2023.pdf> (Chapter 12).

⁶ The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy, *The Annual Report of Human Rights Violations in Oman – 2017* (January 1, 2018), available at <https://ochrdoman.org/en/the-annual-report-2017/>.

- 2.8. In December 2020, the Minister of Information introduced an [amendment](#) to the Press and Publications Law, mandating that digital and electronic media be governed under the traditional media law. It is noteworthy that while the law typically includes a clause affirming that "freedom of the press is guaranteed" under the Basic Statute of the State, other domestic laws place restrictions on this freedom and reinforce self-censorship among journalists and media professionals.
- 2.9. Article 249 of the Press and Publications law prohibits the publication of news related to an ongoing investigation or relevant document without permission from the public prosecutor's office or the competent court, with penalties of up to two years in prison and fines. This provision has been used to target journalists writing about corruption or other sensitive issues.
- 2.10. In March 2022, journalist [Mukhtar Al-Hinai](#) was charged under Article 249 after tweeting about a case of financial and administrative corruption in a government ministry. Despite the case concluding in July 2022 with the court's acquittal, he remains suspended from work due to the pressures exerted on him.⁷
- 2.11. In March 2023, journalist [Fatima Al-Arimi](#) announced the suspension of her news platform, "WAF Agency," without providing any reasons. It is noteworthy that in January 2017, the Omani Ministry of Information had revoked Al-Arimi's representation licence for the "Reuters" news agency.
- 2.12. Although acquitted in court, the writer and online activist Mohammed Ali Bakhit (Abu Ali Al-Barami), was detained on 07 March 2024 by security forces and held incommunicado. He was charged with allegedly distorting the government's image and directing insulting criticism at its ministers, which demonstrated the lengths taken by the authorities to silence dissent.⁸

Media Law

- 2.13. On 10 November 2024, Haitham bin Tariq issued Royal Decree No. 58/2024 concerning the Media Law. Although Article 3 annulled abusive and outdated legislation, such as the Press and Publications Law, it nevertheless included provisions that have generated even greater concern. Among these provisions are penalties imposed on journalists and media professionals, including imprisonment and fines. The law also addresses the regulation of social media platforms in a manner that may subject content creators on YouTube and podcasters to legal accountability.
- 2.14. Although the new law repealed its predecessor, it simultaneously incorporated many of the provisions from the previous legislation and even expanded upon them, granting the authorities greater control over and restriction of media activities. For instance, Clause (2) of **Article 4** stipulates a prohibition on publishing any information related to an ongoing investigation or trial until a final verdict is issued. In contrast, under the previous "Press and Publications Law," **Article 29** required a

⁷ The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy, *On World Press Freedom Day, New Legislation Further Curtails Press Freedom and Journalistic Activity (May 2025)*, <https://ochrdoman.org/en/press-day-25-2/>.

⁸ <https://www.gc4hr.org/writer-mohammed-ali-bakhit-abu-ali-al-barami-released/>

court order to prevent publication, meaning that publication could only be restricted if the court explicitly decided against it.

- 2.15. The new law dedicates an entire chapter to penalties, whereas the previous law contained only four penalties related to printing, licensing of publications, and the dissemination of content deemed to undermine the Sultan or the ruling family, in addition to the publication of prohibited materials. In contrast, the new law includes ten distinct penalties (Articles 50-59) and grants judicial enforcement powers to Ministry of Information officials for the implementation of its provisions, as stipulated in Article 49. Notably, the new law avoids duplicating penalties already specified in the Penal Code, such as those related to undermining the Sultan or the ruling family.
- 2.16. Clause (3) of Article 4 of the law stipulates a prohibition on publishing or broadcasting any news, information, or data that the Ministry has instructed not to disclose. This will allow even easier suppression of cases such as the closure of the newspaper *Azamn* in 2016, following its publication of an investigative report on corruption within the judiciary and high-ranking state positions.
- 2.17. An example of the impact was the terrorist attack in the Al-Wadi Al-Kabir area of Muscat Governorate in July 2024, where both state and private media outlets refrained from reporting or covering the event due to security directives prohibiting publication.
- 2.18. Notably, the new law does not reference the "capital requirement" previously stipulated in **Article 38** of the former legislation. It remains unclear whether the omission of the capital requirement signifies its repeal or if it is an effort to avoid redundancy, given that this requirement is addressed in a different law, namely the [Commercial Companies Law](#). Nonetheless, **Article 12** of the new law introduces a requirement termed "financial guarantee," without specifying its amount. It clarifies that the purpose of the financial guarantee is to ensure the proper fulfilment of conditions and compliance with obligations outlined in the executive regulations of the law. The article also states that if any deductions are made from the financial guarantee, the licensee is obligated to replenish the guarantee to its original value.
- 2.19. Additionally, the new law contains several other notable points, such as Article 16, which allows for the revocation of a licence for any institution on grounds described by the law as pertaining to "national security requirements."
- 2.20. Regrettably, the new media law seems primarily intended to reinforce state control over media operations and expand the existing restrictions. It also promotes a culture of self-censorship among journalists and media professionals, who may hesitate to fully exercise their duties out of fear of breaching any of the prohibitions outlined in the law. Such violations could expose them to legal consequences, including job loss, revocation of their licence, as well as imprisonment or financial penalties.

Nationality Law

- 2.21. Under the Nationality Law, (17/2025)⁹ the first clause of article 26 stipulates that a natural-born Omani citizen may be stripped of their nationality if they engage in verbal or physical acts deemed offensive to the Sultanate of Oman or His Majesty the Sultan. However, the law fails to provide any explicit definition or clarification of what constitutes an "offence," effectively granting the Ministry of Interior sole discretion in its interpretation and application. Notably, the law explicitly excludes the judiciary from having jurisdiction over nationality-related disputes.
- 2.22. Furthermore, this article reiterates provisions from the previous law, which allow for the revocation of nationality in cases where an Omani citizen:
- Joins a group, party, or organisation that harms national interests;
 - Engages in activities on behalf of a foreign state in a manner contrary to national interests; or
 - Acts in service of a hostile state.
- 2.23. Regarding Article 26 of the Nationality Law, as of July 2025, the OCHRD is not aware of any documented incidents related to its application. However, this provision creates a tool that can easily be used by the authorities to suppress dissent and silence individuals who hold opinions contrary to the government or criticise its performance. This legal ambiguity instils fear among citizens, as they risk losing their nationality should they criticise the monarch or advocate for political reforms that the authorities may interpret as an offence to His Majesty.

3. Freedom of Association

- 3.1. In the previous UPR Cycle, Oman accepted 8 of the 11 recommendations on freedom of Association and noted 3. The noted or rejected recommendations all referred to amending the penal code or permitting political participation.
- 3.2. Notwithstanding Oman's formal commitment to Article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the constitutional guarantees pertaining to the right to form associations, Articles 116 and 117¹⁰ of the Penal Code criminalise members of associations that peacefully work through them to oppose State activities or policies. Such restrictions inherently impede the exercise of political freedoms and undermine the possibility of free and fair elections. Furthermore, Article 118¹¹ of the Penal Code constitutes an undue interference with the right to freedom of expression.

⁹ The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy, Omani Nationality Law (17/2025), <https://ochrdoman.org/en/nationality-2/>.

¹⁰ https://oman.om/docs/default-source/default-document-library/omani-penal-law.pdf?sfvrsn=64250c36_2 Arts. 116-117

¹¹ https://oman.om/docs/default-source/default-document-library/omani-penal-law.pdf?sfvrsn=64250c36_2

Art 118

4. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

- 4.1. In the previous UPR Cycle, Oman accepted 10 of the 13 recommendations of freedom of assembly and noted 3. The noted or rejected recommendations all referred to amending the penal code, press and publications law, or political participation.
- 4.2. Articles 121 and 123 of Oman’s Penal Code¹² constitute a violation of the right to freedom of the UDHR. The OCHRD understands that these provisions are routinely invoked by the authorities to suppress peaceful gatherings and demonstrations.
- 4.3. Several cities in Oman, including Sohar and Salalah, witnessed mass protests in May 2021 in response to economic conditions, particularly rising unemployment. The demonstrations were met with a violent crackdown by security forces, resulting in the arrest of a significant number of protesters, who were later released.¹³
- 4.4. On 10 April 2025, the Court of First Instance issued a one-year prison sentence and a fine of 500 Omani riyals against internet activist and religious preacher Talal bin Ahmed Al-Salmani, after convicting him of the misdemeanour for participating in a peaceful gathering on 07 April 2025, in Muscat, in solidarity with the people of Gaza where he also harshly criticised the government. He was also sentenced to a second year in prison for the misdemeanour of broadcasting news and rumours that undermined the prestige of the state.¹⁴
- 4.5. On 27 August 2022, businessman and internet activist **Hani bin Ali Al-Sarhani** announced, in a video recording posted on his YouTube account, the start of a peaceful sit-in on various social and economic issues by him and his two colleagues **Mahmoud bin Al-Murr Al-Ghabshi** and **Saud Al-Mardouf Al-Kathiri**. Several hours after the sit-in began in the Muscat, they were arrested and taken to an unknown location.¹⁵ Al-Sarhani noted that his sit-in had “less than 10 people in implementation of the law that prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people.” The Internal Security Service (ISS) issued strict orders for their immediate arrest after the video of the sit-in went viral on social media. They were arbitrarily arrested a few hours after they started the sit-in, and they were taken from the place of their sit-in in Muscat to an unknown location.

5. Targeting Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Activists

- 5.1. Human rights defenders and civil society activists have been targeted for their activism, including environmental activism. They have been arrested and imprisoned, kidnapped and held incommunicado, and lost jobs and other opportunities.

¹² https://oman.om/docs/default-source/default-document-library/omani-penal-law.pdf?sfvrsn=64250c36_2 Art 121, 123

¹³ The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy, *The Annual Report on Human Rights Situations in Oman – 2021* (January, 2022, <https://ochrdoman.org/en/annual-report-2021-2/>).

¹⁴ <https://www.gc4hr.org/one-year-prison-sentence-issued-against-internet-activist-and-religious-preacher-talal-bin-ahmed-al-salmani/>

¹⁵ <https://www.gc4hr.org/three-businessmen-forcibly-disappeared-immediately-after-declaring-a-peaceful-sit-in/>

- 5.2. For example, an Omani court has sentenced three environmental activists to prison, ranging from one to six months, with fines, in March 2021. On 31 March 2021, the Court of First Instance in Salalah sentenced poet and Internet activist **Salem Ali Al-Maashani** to one month suspended imprisonment and a fine of 1000 Omani Riyals (approx. USD\$2700). The Court sentenced environmental activist Dr. **Ahmed Issa Qatan** to six months' imprisonment and a fine of 1000 Omani riyals, with a payment of 500 Omani Riyals to appeal the verdict. The Court sentenced online activist **Salem Tabuk** to two months in prison and a fine of 1000 Omani riyals. The Public Prosecution alleged that they had committed “a misdemeanor to use the Internet to publish information that would harm the public order,” under Article 19 of the Omani Cyber Crime Law.¹⁶ This trial was a result of the Internal Security Service (ISS) campaign against activists who are seeking to preserve the traditional way of life in the Dhofar Plain that has existed for hundreds of years. They protested plans to transfer authority over the Dhofar Plain to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning to allow the construction of housing complexes in these green spaces.
- 5.3. On 04 August 2022, Dr. Qatan was again arrested by the ISS over some tweets criticising the authorities about lack of job opportunities. He was held in detention until 16 August 2022.¹⁷
- 5.4. On 11 December 2022, online activist **Majid bin Abdullah Al-Ruhaili** was kidnapped¹⁸ by the ISS while he was in a gym in Muscat. Al-Ruhaili uses [his social media account](#) to courageously express his personal views on citizens' public affairs, his desire for comprehensive reform, and his belief that the people are the source of all powers. Reliable local sources confirmed to GCHR that the main reason for his abduction was his posts that contained his frank opinions. He was forcibly held incommunicado for several weeks in one of the prisons of the Special Division of the Omani Police Command in Muscat, which represents the executive arm of the ISS. He was released on 04 January 2023.
- 5.5. Businessman and internet activist **Hani bin Al-Sarhani** was arrested¹⁹ on 09 August 2022, after being summoned by the Special Division of the Omani Police Command in the Muscat after using his Twitter account to appeal to officials to provide support to businesspeople and citizens alike due to what he called the difficult period that everyone is going through.
- 5.6. Prominent human rights defender and lawyer **Awad Bin Ali Al-Sawafi** faces ongoing judicial harassment in Oman that violates his civil rights solely due to his peaceful and legitimate human rights activities. On 30 June 2025, the Court of Appeal in Muscat upheld the initial ruling, and rejected Al-Sawafi's appeal against the decision to dismiss him from his position as a legal affairs researcher at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Water Resources, on security grounds. He has been continuously targeted by the ISS for his independent human rights work.²⁰

¹⁶ <https://www.gc4hr.org/four-peaceful-activists-sentenced-to-prison-and-another-citizen-tortured/>

¹⁷ <https://www.gc4hr.org/businessman-and-environmental-activist-arrested/>

¹⁸ <https://www.gc4hr.org/grave-violations-against-women-and-internet-activists/>

¹⁹ <https://www.gc4hr.org/businessman-and-environmental-activist-arrested/>

²⁰ <https://www.gc4hr.org/court-of-appeal-issues-unfair-verdict-against-prominent-human-rights-defender-awad-al-sawafi/>

6. The Death Penalty

- 6.1. A number of States recommended in the 2015 UPR that Oman Ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty. Several other States recommended that Oman take the necessary measures to eliminate the death penalty or adopt a moratorium on the death penalty with a view to abolishing its use.
- 6.2. Several UN General Assembly resolutions have called for the eventual abolition of the death penalty by Member States, urging States to progressively restrict its use and to reduce the number of offences for which the death penalty serves as punishment.²¹
- 6.3. Despite this, the Oman's new Penal Code includes the death penalty a punishment for a number of crimes. The death sentence is prescribed as punishment or noted as a potential punishment for the crimes in Articles 94, 95, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 113, 117, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 156, 164, 167, 260, and 302.
- 6.4. Since the 2015 UPR, Oman has continued to impose and implement the death penalty. Notably, two executions were carried out in the country in 2023.²²

7. Recommendations to the Government of Oman

At a minimum, the following conditions must be guaranteed: freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly, the right to a fair trial, as well as the right to act without unwarranted state interference and the state's duty to protect. The following specific recommendations are made:

1. Adopt the following International Legal Instruments:

- ICCPR

2. Freedom of expression, media freedom and access to information

- Amend the Penal code, particularly articles 97 and 115, to remove barriers to free speech by decriminalising criticism of the Sultan or vaguely worded provisions such as “undermining the stature of the State”.
- Amend the 2002 Telecommunications Law and the 2011 Cybercrime Law to bring them into line with international standards on the right to freedom of opinion and expression.

²¹ See United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2007*, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/149 (26 February 2008); United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2008*, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/168 (13 February 2009); United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 2010*, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/206 (28 March 2011); United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2012*, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/176 (20 March 2013).

²² The Omani Centre for Human Rights & Democracy, *The Annual Report of Human Rights in Oman 2023*, Capital Punishment p.15: <https://ochrdoman.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/The-Annual-Report-Oman-2023.pdf>.

- Amend the new Media Law to remove vague provisions that can be used to silence peaceful dissent.
- Amend the new Nationality Law by removing provisions allowing for the stripping of nationality for peaceful criticism of the ruler or the state.
- Ensure that journalists and writers work freely and without fear of retribution for expressing critical opinions or covering topics that the government may deem sensitive.

3. Freedom of association

- Take measures to foster a safe, respectful and enabling environment for civil society, including by removing legal and policy measures that unwarrantedly limit the freedom of association.
- Amend articles 116-118 that criminalise members of associations that oppose government policies, thereby allowing civil society to participate fully.

4. Freedom of peaceful assembly

- Bring national legislation Notably Articles 121, and 123 of the penal code, on freedom of peaceful assembly into line with international standards, particularly by removing the penalty for unlicensed public gatherings.
- Adopt best practices on the freedom of peaceful assembly, as put forward by the 2012 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, which calls for simple processes for the notification of assemblies being held rather than permission being required, and by General Comment No. 37 on the right to peaceful assembly adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee in 2020.

5. Protection of human rights defenders and civil society activists

- Provide civil society members, HRDs and journalists, especially women, with a safe and secure environment in which to carry out their work.
- Undertake a consolidated process of repeal or amendment of legislation and decrees that unwarrantedly restrict the legitimate work of HRDs, in line with the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.
- End the practice of using the judicial system to try HRDs, journalists and anyone else for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association.

Annex 1: Assessment of implementation of civic space recommendations under the 3rd cycle

<p>134.5 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to complement the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Spain);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 2</p>
<p>134.12 Sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Netherlands);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.13 Ratify and fully implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Australia);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 2</p>
<p>134.14 Ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.15 Expedite the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Uzbekistan);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.16 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mauritius);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.17 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Slovenia);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.18-22 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Brazil, Czechia, Luxembourg, Germany, Indonesia)</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.23 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to further promote and protect civil and political rights (Japan);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>

<p>134.24 Consider ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Republic of Korea);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.25 Consider ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Ukraine);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.27 Ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in the spirit of Royal Decree No. 6/2021 promulgating the new Basic Law of State (Switzerland);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.86 Guarantee the right to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration, refraining from criminalizing dissenting opinions from those of the Government (Chile);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>
<p>134.87 Complete the enactment of legislation on promoting freedom of opinion and expression (Kenya);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.89 Promote and protect the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly of all residents of Oman (Latvia);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2,4</p>
<p>134.90 Continue its efforts to ensure the right to freedom of expression and opinion for all (Libya);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.91 Implement legal reforms to eliminate constraints on the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly (Australia);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>

<p>134.92 Recognize the right to peacefully exercise freedom of expression, association and assembly and remove or revise legal provisions criminalizing those rights (Italy);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>
<p>134.93 Withdraw the references in the national legislation that criminalize the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, ensuring that it is compatible and consistent with international human rights obligations and standards (Uruguay);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>
<p>134.94 Bring national legislation into line with international standards on freedom of opinion and expression, including the new Penal Code, the Press and Publications Law, the Cybercrime Law and the Telecommunications Law (Belgium);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.95 Ensure that the Penal Code and other relevant legislation are aligned with international standards and codify and protect rights of free speech, as well as freedom of association and assembly (Canada);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.98 Proceed with amending the provisions of the executive regulations of the Press and Publications Law (Lebanon);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.99 Guarantee freedom of expression, association and assembly and end the detention of people for exercising freedom of opinion and expression (France);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>
<p>134.100 Promote and protect freedom of opinion and expression, both online and offline, including by considering amending current national legislation (Greece);</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2</p>
<p>134.101 Protect and uphold the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, including by respecting and supporting free and independent media, in line with international human rights standards (Iceland);</p>	Supported	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2,4</p>

134.102 Ensure that the new law on the media and the new law on civil society associations are drafted and implemented in accordance with international standards on the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of peaceful assembly and of association (Switzerland);	Supported	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 2-4
134.110 Ensure further facilitation of the association registration system (Kuwait);	Supported	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 3
134.111 Guarantee the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression, expand its dialogue with civil society and create an enabling environment for civil society organizations (Czechia);	Supported	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 2-4
134.4 Maintain its substantive progress in the ratification of international human rights instruments, through the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two optional protocols (Chile); Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1 Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1	Supported/Noted	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 2,5
134.6 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (France); Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1	Supported/Noted	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 2,5
134.8 Sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two optional protocols (Honduras); Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1	Supported/Noted	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 2,5
134.9 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its optional protocols (Finland); Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1	Supported/Noted	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 2,5
134.10 Consider ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (Latvia); Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1	Supported/Noted	Status: Not Implemented Source: Sections: 2,5

<p>134.11 Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and commute all death sentences to prison sentences (Romania);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Supported/Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2,5</p>
<p>134.26 Fully abolish the death penalty and ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (Iceland);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 2,5</p>
<p>134.73 Abolish the death penalty (Czechia);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 5</p>
<p>134.74 Abolish the death penalty (Czechia); Establish an official moratorium on imposing and carrying out the death penalty, as a step towards its complete abolition (Australia) (Estonia) (Finland) (France) (Italy) (Latvia) (Malta) (Portugal) (Uruguay);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 5</p>
<p>134.75 Translate, de jure, the de facto suspension that has been implemented since 2015 on the execution of the death penalty, through the formal adoption of an indefinite moratorium (Spain);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 5</p>
<p>134.76 Consider establishing an official moratorium on executions and take positive steps to abolish the death penalty (Argentina) (Fiji);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 5</p>
<p>134.88 Guarantee the right to freedom of expression, assembly and association by amending the Penal Code and other laws such as the Press and Publications Law (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>
<p>134.96 Amend the 2002 Telecommunications Law and the 2011 Cybercrime Law to bring them into line with international standards on the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Denmark);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	Noted	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Section: 2-4</p>

<p>134.97 Review the Penal Code and remove all restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly (Estonia);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	<p>Noted</p>	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>
<p>134.106 Amend criminal defamation provisions in the Penal Code as well as the Cybercrime Law and the Civil Societies Law to increase respect for fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, on- and offline (United States of America);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	<p>Noted</p>	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>
<p>134.109 Take measures to protect freedom of association, assembly and expression and remove any impediments to the work of political opposition parties, human rights defenders and independent civil society organizations (Ireland);</p> <p>Source of Position: A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1</p>	<p>Noted</p>	<p>Status: Not Implemented</p> <p>Source:</p> <p>Sections: 2-4</p>