On 01 June 2026, the new Cybercrime Law 61/2026 was issued, following its ratification by Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman. It became effective from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette on 07 June 2026.
Human rights defenders and local legal experts described the new law as more repressive than its predecessor, aiming to completely suppress public freedoms. It imposes severe restrictions on online freedom of expression and includes unjustifiably harsh penalties. The notorious Internal Security Service (ISS) is expected to use the provisions of this law to imprison online activists and dissidents in order to silence them and intimidate other segments of society, just as it did under the previous law.
Article 4 of the law refers to the competencies of the Cyber Defence Center, whose establishment was documented by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) under Royal Decree No. 64 of 2020. GCHR described it as consolidating “absolute control to the Internal Security Service (ISS) – known for its continuous suppression of public freedoms, including freedom of expression on the Internet – over Internet users inside the country, their devices, and the data they save on these devices.”
Article 20 is specifically designed to target internet activists, restrict freedom of expression online, and criminalise content critical of the government and its policies, according to the discretion of the authorities themselves, including the ISS, and their predominantly repressive convictions.
This article uses vague terms that can be applied against any critical content, news article, or opinion against corruption, such as publishing or republishing anything that might “disrupt public order and morals” or “spread rumours and misinformation.”
This will allow authorities to file lawsuits against internet activists under this article, with penalties ranging from one month to three years imprisonment and a fine of between 1,000 and 3,000 Omani rials.
The penalty is more severe, ranging from three to ten years imprisonment and a hefty fine of between 5,000 and 10,000 Omani rials, “if the intent is to incite sedition.” This is undoubtedly another vague term that can be applied to all opponents of the government and its policies.
These same penalties apply to citizens who interact with, share, or republish published material. The authorities’ objective is clear: to prevent citizens from organising online to defend their civil and human rights.
Article 21 directly targets anyone who uses the internet to “incite or call for gatherings, strikes, sit-ins, or marches,” unless authorised by the authorities. This is yet another article whose sole purpose is to deprive citizens of their right to call online for peaceful gatherings, assemblies, and marches has proven that the authorities are only serious about preventing them.
The penalty for violating this article is imprisonment for a period of no less than three 3 months and no more than one year, and a fine of no less than 1,000 Omani rials and no more than 3,000 Omani rials.
Article 23 is another repressive article that uses vague, undefined, and ambiguous terms. It states: “Anyone who uses a website, information system, or information technology tool to publish false or malicious news, data, or rumors, or to broadcast inflammatory propaganda, with the intent of harming the reputation, standing, or prestige of the State or any of its authorities or institutions, or weakening confidence in its financial markets or its economic and financial standing, or directly or indirectly affecting its security, social, or health stability, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than three months and not more than three years, and by a fine of not less than 2,000 Omani rials and not more than 5,000 Omani rials.”
Undoubtedly, the authorities can claim that any content they choose, according to this article, constitutes malicious rumours or inflammatory propaganda intended to “harm the reputation, standing, or prestige of the State,” or “directly or indirectly affect its security, social, or health stability.” Since 2011, GCHR has documented numerous cases of this type, clearly reflecting the authorities’ relentless suppression of dissenting opinions.
Article 26 is another article used to suppress voices exercising their right to criticise the policies of other countries. It punishes with imprisonment for a period of not less than six months and not more than three years, and a fine of not less than 1000 Omani riyals and not more than 5000 Omani riyals. It targets anyone who criticises online the head of a “foreign state or its head of government, or a representative of a foreign state accredited to the Sultanate of Oman, or insults any of them personally,” or publishes “anything that could harm the foreign relations or interests of the Sultanate of Oman.”
Article 27 is designed to prevent any criticism of the judiciary or discussion of corruption within its institutions. It punishes, “with imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than three years, and a fine of not less than 1,000 Omani rials and not more than 3,000 Omani rials,” anyone who uses the internet “to publicly undermine the respect due to the judiciary in a manner that casts doubt on its integrity or its adherence to the provisions of the law.”
Article 30 aims to prevent human rights defenders and other activists from contacting and coordinating with international mechanisms, including those of the United Nations and international human rights organisations. It punishes, “with imprisonment for a period of not less than three months and not more than three years, and a fine of not less than 2,000 Omani rials and not more than 5,000 Omani rials,” anyone who uses the internet “to provide false or misleading information to individuals, organisations, institutions, bodies, or any other entities, which would harm the interests of the state or damage its reputation, prestige, or standing.”
Undoubtedly, the authorities can label any accurate reports or information about serious human rights violations in the country as “false or misleading information.”
The penalty is more severe in “states of emergency, times of war, disasters, or epidemics,” and includes “imprisonment for a period of not less than five years and not more than 15 years, and a fine of not less than 10,000 Omani rials and not more than 100,000 Omani rials.”
This means that periods of crisis are being used by the authorities to completely silence dissent.
Article 32 is specifically designed to prevent any criticism directed at the Sultan, his Crown Prince, his wife, and the rest of his family. It uses vague terms and legally ambiguous wording, punishing “with imprisonment for a period of not less than three years and not more than ten years, and a fine of not less than 3,000 Omani rials and not more than 5,000 Omani rials,” anyone who uses the internet “to challenge the Sultan’s rights and authority, or to insult him personally,” as well as all members of his family.
No one knows precisely what the legal definitions of the terms “challenge” and “defamation” are.
In a report published on 26 June 2018, by GCHR, entitled “Mapping Cybercrime Laws and Violations of Digital Rights in the Gulf Region and Neighbouring Countries,” the provisions of the previous Law 12/2011 were described as “impeding, due to their vague wording and broad interpretations, the efforts of human rights defenders and activists to expose corruption and injustice.”
After a thorough and comprehensive assessment of the provisions of the new law, GCHR believes it is even more restrictive of the work of human rights defenders and online activists than the previous law and aims to completely eliminate their peaceful work. Its wording has taken a repressive turn, failing to strike a balance between protecting the state and safeguarding citizens’ digital rights. In its current form, this law aims to further restrict public freedoms, particularly freedom of expression online, and will lead to more serious human rights violations.
GCHR calls on the Omani government to amend the provisions of this law that infringe upon citizens’ public freedoms and replace them with provisions that respect and protect these freedoms.
The authorities in Oman must protect citizens’ public freedoms, particularly freedom of expression online and offline, and cease the harassment of human rights defenders in Oman.
These authorities must also guarantee, under all circumstances, the ability of human rights defenders in Oman to carry out their legitimate human rights work without fear of reprisal and without undue restrictions, including judicial harassment.
